kuwait

kuwait

LIBERATE KUWAIT CASE

On August 2, 1990, when Iraq invaded Kuwait, the United States had to decide
how to handle the situation.   Should they use offensive force or will sanctions be
effective in driving Iraq out of Kuwait?   This was the main question that President Bush
and his advisors had to answer.   Unfortunately, not everyone had the same opinion on
how to solve the situation.   Shortly after Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait President Bush
made a statement in which he stated that “ Iraq must completely withdraw from Kuwait”
(236).   President Bush felt that the only successful method in liberating Kuwait was to
use force.   Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense, also agreed with the President.   He felt
that sanctions on Iraq were not effective and it would not guarantee success.   However,
Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, felt that alternatives were not being
considered equally.   Powell thought that containment and economic sanctions on Iraq
could prove to be effective.   General Powell talked to Brent Scowcroft, National Security
Council Director, to see if the alternatives were being discussed with the President.   As
National Security Director it was his job to see that all alternatives would be equally
weighed.   Scowcroft, however, agreed with the President that sanctions were not
working.  
In October Powell told General Schwarzkoph that Bush wanted a preliminary
plan of an offensive attack.   There were three phases of the plan.   The first three were an
air attack, and the fourth plan was a ground attack.   The plan was considered to be
inadequate, the U.S. did not have enough forces to attack.   “On October 30, 1990,
President bush met with Powell, Cheney, Scowcroft, and Baker to discuss what policy
was to be used, Deter-and defend, or an offensive plan”(245).  
There are some important lessons   form this case study that should be reviewed.
One aspect is the miscommunication or lack of it. From the beginning their was...